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20VC: Why the IPO Market is not Closed | Why Revenue Multiples are BS and Founders Need to Change | Advice From Jack Ma, Jamie Dimon and Evan Spiegel | Lessons from Taking Snap & Alibaba Public with Imran Khan

20VC · Harry Stebbings — Imran Khan · August 26, 2024 · Original

Most important take away

The IPO market isn’t closed - founders’ valuation expectations are too high after the 2020-2021 capital glut, and staying private too long is actually bad for companies because public markets force better decisions, provide currency for acquisitions, and offer daily feedback that helps CEOs pivot through the ~15-year technology shifts (mainframe to micro to internet to mobile to AI). Revenue multiples are largely “BS” - what matters is gross margins, sustainable growth, and the path to GAAP earnings, since cats and tigers look identical as babies but a cat never becomes a tiger.

Summary

Actionable insights and career/business lessons from Imran Khan (former Snap CSO, Alibaba IPO banker, Google IPO analyst):

On going public:

  • Go public earlier rather than later. Valuation is a snapshot, not a destiny - Amazon, Facebook, Shopify all went through brutal post-IPO volatility and became dominant.
  • If morale collapses because of stock price, you hired mercenaries instead of missionaries - that’s a culture failure, not a market failure.
  • Public markets force you to make better decisions, give you acquisition currency, and provide daily investor feedback that helps you pivot. AWS, the iPhone, and AI GPUs were all built inside public companies - the “you can only do great things while private” claim is BS.
  • Continuously raising private rounds just to provide employee liquidity (via marked-up secondaries from existing investors) doesn’t feel right - if you don’t want to be public, become profitable and buy back stock instead.

On valuation and multiples:

  • Revenue multiples are mostly BS - they only make sense for high-gross-margin SaaS where you can predict steady-state cash flow. Don’t apply them to consumer or delivery businesses with 20% gross margins.
  • The right framework: project revenue out 10 years at your sustainable growth rate, apply realistic incremental margins, then a GAAP earnings multiple (17-25x), then discount back at your required rate of return.
  • For slow-growth public SaaS (Box, Dropbox, Twilio): improve margins, drive efficiency, return capital. There’s nothing wrong with being a steady business - just stop trying to look like a hypergrowth one.

On IPO mechanics (career advice for founders/operators):

  • Capital markets run on trust - “100 years to build, one day to destroy” (Jamie Dimon). Build investor relationships years before you need them.
  • 90% of one-on-one roadshow meetings converting to orders = a good IPO; under 50% = pulled deal.
  • Pricing: leave some on the table. New investor relationships need goodwill, and the small float means institutions need room to dollar-cost-average up post-IPO or they’ll dump.
  • Concentrated, high-quality buyers signal a hot IPO; thinly-spread allocations mean PMs will sell because the position doesn’t move their needle.
  • Don’t shorten the 180-day lockup - it signals existing investors think the stock is overpriced short-term.

On M&A:

  • Lina Khan isn’t the whole story - seller valuation expectations are also too high. Only the top ~20 of ~2000 $2B+ public companies face real antitrust scrutiny on deals.
  • The Wiz/Google walk-away: Khan suggests it may have been a mistake. CrowdStrike-level (20x revenue) multiples are unsustainable; over time SaaS reverts toward 7x revenue, and as a private company grows it dilutes further.
  • Jack Ma’s quote: “When their babies cats and tigers look same, but a cat never become a tiger.” Most “future tigers” don’t make it - play the probability game.

On AI capex:

  • Don’t focus on tech cuteness - focus on productivity gains. 5-10% US productivity improvement = $1.5-3 trillion in value.
  • Hyperscalers must spend on capex to protect cloud cash cows (lesson from Google vs. Yahoo - Yahoo’s lack of spend killed it). Risk: demand may stabilize like Amazon’s post-COVID overbuild.
  • LLMs are just an entry point. The real value layers: humanoid robots, self-driving, recommendation engines, defense, ad efficiency.

On founders (Evan Spiegel lessons):

  • Three traits of great founders: (1) deep understanding of their customers, (2) deep conviction (return is a function of risk only you see), (3) high pain tolerance during the long arc of being proven right.
  • Great founders pivot: Google started as enterprise search, Netflix sold DVDs, Amazon sold books.

Khan’s Snap regret: Growing zero to $1.6B in 4 years was intoxicating but unsustainable - he wishes he had invested in self-serve ads, attribution, and SMB/DR products earlier to smooth the growth curve. Lesson: when growth is hypersonic, you skip planning the next phase because you’re too busy executing the current one.

Storytelling lesson from Alibaba IPO: Simplify ruthlessly. Alibaba was positioned as “eBay + Amazon + PayPal of China” - if a PM can’t understand the story in 30 seconds, they won’t do the work. Avoid jargon; analogies like “Uber for X” work because they unlock interest, not because they’re literally true.

Creative deal lesson (Alibaba): When raising $1.75B post-Facebook-crash, Khan offered global investors no lockup on their allocation - zero cost to the company (they’d have to buy more post-IPO anyway to build meaningful position size) but huge perceived value to investors burned by FB.

Career meta-lessons:

  • Fiduciary duty is to LPs, not founders. Investors who claim otherwise are clueless or lying.
  • Public market investors generally shouldn’t do early-stage private - different skill set (access, judgment, deal flow vs. analytical pattern matching). Crossover into pre-IPO 12-month deals is fine; doing Series B/C/D is a mistake.
  • After-tax return is the question almost no one asks - and it should be.
  • Biggest career mistake: lack of focus. Keep the main thing the main thing.
  • “Market likes to make a fool of the greatest number of people” - always question consensus.

Chapter Summaries

Is the IPO window closed? (Open) - Khan argues it’s not closed; private companies are anchored to inflated 2020-2021 valuations. Allocators over-rotated to private to dampen volatility, but DPI is now drying up and many private marks represent permanent capital loss not yet recognized.

Why staying private too long is dangerous - Tech landscape shifts every ~15 years (mainframe -> micro -> internet -> mobile -> AI). Public markets force CEOs to confront these shifts via daily investor feedback. Most transformative products (AWS, iPhone, GPUs) came from public companies.

Mercenaries vs. missionaries - If stock-price volatility wrecks morale, founders hired the wrong people. Bezos and Zuck kept their teams through far worse volatility.

Revenue multiples are BS - Only justified for high-gross-margin SaaS with predictable contracted cash flow. Slow-growth SaaS companies (Box, Dropbox) became better businesses because going public forced discipline.

Liquidity, secondaries, and Stripe - Constantly raising rounds to provide employee liquidity via marked-up existing-investor checks is “not a great look.” Honorable alternatives: become profitable and buy back stock, or sell the company.

Lina Khan and M&A - Khan disagrees with over-regulation but says blaming Lina for everything misses the real issue: seller expectations are still too high. Top ~20 companies face real scrutiny; the other 1,980 mostly don’t.

Wiz/Google deal - Khan thinks walking away may have been a mistake; CrowdStrike trades at 20x revenue but mature SaaS reverts to 7x, and dilution along the way compounds. Cats vs. tigers analogy.

IPO pricing philosophy - Disagrees with Bill Gurley’s “leaving money on the table” critique. New investor relationships need goodwill; small float means institutions need post-IPO upside to build positions.

How IPO bookbuilding actually works - Two-week roadshow, ~60 meetings, 90% conversion = great deal. Set initial range with 98% conviction and move up based on demand. Concentrated quality demand = hot IPO; dispersed = future selling.

Lockups - Stick with 180 days. Shortening signals insider concern about price sustainability.

Asymmetric information - Long-duration insiders (Sequoia-type) have real edge on a 10-year view via knowing how founders pivot under pressure. Short-term, public investors are better at managing public market risk.

Politics and unrealized gains tax - Khan argues for smart, light regulation; unrealized capital gains tax sets dangerous precedent (today 20 people, tomorrow 200,000).

AI capex vs. revenue gap - Frame it as productivity unlock. Google-vs-Yahoo capex debate eventually vindicated Google. Risk: COVID-style demand normalization could leave hyperscalers with stranded capacity. LLMs are just the entry point - real value in robots, self-driving, recommendations, defense.

Taking Alibaba public - Khan’s background: Bangladeshi immigrant, became Google IPO analyst, befriended Joe Tsai in 2004, did the $8B Yahoo buyback financing in 2012, then IPO. Creative no-lockup tranche for global investors solved the post-Facebook-crash trust problem.

Lesson from Alibaba IPO - Simplify the story. “China consumer play, eBay + Amazon + PayPal of China.” If a PM can’t get it in 30 seconds, it dies.

China today - No regulatory predictability = unanalyzable. Hard to commit new capital until that changes.

Snap and Evan Spiegel - Khan went from $0 to $1.6B in four years as CSO. Evan’s traits: deep customer understanding, conviction (lenses, maps, stories all looked weird ex-ante), pain tolerance. Snap’s $200M Alibaba investment came through Joe Tsai relationship.

Snap regret - Grew too fast. Should have built self-serve ads, attribution, SMB/DR earlier to smooth growth and reset expectations.

Quickfire round - Believes market loves to fool the majority. Crossover funds going deep into early-stage is a mistake (different skill set). Biggest life lesson: focus. Changed mind: AI is as important as the internet, but the context window for who benefits matters enormously. Question no one asks: after-tax return.